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Before the great extravaganza of the 
Lewis and Clark Exposition in 1905, 
Portlanders felt daring when they pre- 
dicted a metropolitan population of 
200,000. In the decade that followed the 
exposition, they became accustomed to 
targets that have yet to be reached - 1.5 
million, 2 million, 4 million. The 
"Greater Portland Plan" of 1911 envi- 
sioned a Paris of the Pacific, with the 
Willamette River standing in for the 
Seine. In a Utopian pastiche that a busi- 
nessman published in 1913, the city of 
1999 stretched 40 miles from Hillsboro 
to Mount Hood, with 50-story depart- 
ment stores and office towers served by 
flying vehicles.1 
Even though it failed to match the 
grandest expectations, Portland did ex- 
perience extraordinary change in the 20 
years after its world's fair. The city's 
population nearly tripled in two waves 
of growth that lasted from 1905 to 1912 
and from 1917 into the mid-1920s. The 
balance of population shifted from the 
west side of the Willamette to the east 
side. Private investors reconstructed the 
downtown business center. Local gov- 
ernment provided sewers, parks, streets, 
bridges, and docks at a cost that could 
scarcely have been imagined in the 19th 
century.2 
Dreams of magnificence were only one 
response to this unprecedented growth. 
A more practical reaction was the self- 
conscious effort o use comprehensive 
planning to guide the expansion of the 
new east side and the rebuilding of the 
old west side. Calling first on Edward H. 
Bennett and then on Charles H. Cheney, 
two of the nation's most highly regarded 
planning specialists, Portland tested the 
current approaches to the control of ur- 
ban development and land use. From 
1906 to 1917, the city experimented with 
planning as the predetermination of 
public spending and public works pro- 
grams; between 1918 and 1925, it con- 
centrated on channeling private deci- 
sions through housing and zoning 
codes. Together, these Portland efforts in 
the first quarter of the century provide a 
case study of the emergence of modern 
planning practice in the United States. 
1 he most striking characteristic of the 
Portland experience is continuity in the 
politics of planning. Older accounts of 
the growth of the city planning profes- 
sion often describe a sharp change start- 
ing around 1910, a shift in emphasis 
from urban design and architecture to a 
systematic application of social science 
and engineering principles to urban de- 
velopment. The key events have usually 
been listed as the first National Con- 
ference on City Planning and the Prob- 
lems of Congestion (1909), with partici- 
pants as diverse as Jane Addams, the 
philanthropist Robert De Forest, and the 
financier Henry Morganthau; the organi- 
zation of the National Conference on 
City Planning (NCCP) as a permanent 
association (1910); the adoption of gen- 
eral land use zoning in New York City 
(1916); and the establishment of the 
American City Planning Institute (1917). 
The new orthodoxy was codified in the 
inaugural issue of the City Plan in 1915, 
in which the lead editorial by the 
NCCP's secretary, Flavel Shurtleff, an- 
nounced a change of interest from the 
City Beautiful to the City Scientific. 
As with any broad periodization, the 
distinction between planning as urban 
design and planning aimed solely at ef- 
ficiency tends to disappear on detailed 
examination. Daniel Burnham's Plan of 
Chicago (1909) - the climax of City 
Beautiful planning - had concerns be- 
yond aesthetics and was more com- 
prehensive and modern than is some- 
times thought. In contrast, the master 
plans that professional consultants 
mass-produced in the 1920s neglected 
housing, social welfare, and other mat- 
ters germane to social science. Con- 
versely, planning education for at least a 
generation after the presumed change 
continued to approach the subject as a 
design field rather than as a physical or 
social science.3 
1. Jeff W. Hayes, Portland, Oregon, A.D. 1999 
and Other Sketches (Portland, 1913), 1-40. 
2. For population, see U.S. censuses for 1900, 
1910, 1920, and 1930 (12th-15th) and 
estimates from the Portland school census as 
reported in Oregon Bureau of Municipal 
Research, Basic Factors Relating to the 
Financial Problems of Portland (Eugene, 
Oreg., 1946), 5. 
3. Studies that describe a major intellectual 
as well as organizational change include 
Robert A. Walker, The Planning Function in 
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A detailed study of Portland, Oregon, 
further blurs the distinction. It is useful 
to approach the history of Portland city 
planning in terms of a policy analysis 
model that examines the ways in which 
the basic needs of a political entity are 
filtered through a decision-making sys- 
tem, and the ways in which the resulting 
decisions modify the political and so- 
cial environment. In the field of urban 
planning, the perception and the defini- 
tion of problems that require public at- 
tention depend on at least three sets of 
factors - the natural and built environ- 
ment of a metropolis, the economic and 
social goals of local citizens, and under- 
lying political values in both metropolis 
and nation. The planners and planning 
organizations that act on these problems 
work within a context of larger political 
institutions and interest groups. Result- 
ing policies express ideas about urban 
land use held by professional planners, 
politicians, and the interested public. 
The following review of the work of 
Bennett and Cheney in Portland finds 
obvious differences in the type of report 
each man prepared and in his specific 
recommendations. It also finds that 
these reports and policies represented 
two slightly different ways to achieve 
the same results, both efforts at com- 
prehensive planning for Portland having 
been occasioned by concerns about the 
costs of growth. Similar interests within 
the city - individuals and groups who 
agreed on the function of planning - 
sought the expertise first of Bennett and 
then of Cheney. Similar changes in the 
economy punctured the planning bal- 
loon, twice eliminating the need for im- 
mediate action and undermining the im- 
pact of the planners' sound technical 
advice. 
1 imes in Portland had never been so 
good as during the years after the Lewis 
and Clark Centennial Exposition of 
1905. Every statistical indicator told the 
same story of sustained economic 
growth. During the first decade of the 
century, the expansion of employment 
outpaced that of population, which it- 
self leaped by more than 18,000 an- 
nually between 1905 and 1910. An ex- 
traordinary building boom pushed the 
value of building permits up by 400 per- 
cent in each of those five years (see 
Portland Growth Indicators 
1905-1925 
Multnomah Co. 
Building Permits New Single- Motor Vehicle 
($1000s) Family Houses Registration 
1905 4,183 na na 
1906 6,902 na na 
1907 9,447 na na 
1908 10,405 na na 
1909 13,481 na na 
1910 20,886 na na 
1911 19,152 na na 
1912 14,652 na na 
1913 12,316 1,817 5,500 
1914 7,373 1,429 na 
1915 6,210 906 na 
1916 6,336 472 8,808 
1917 3,804 226 20,008 
1918 5,950 567 23,799 
1919 9,463 1,062 29,167 
1920 12,207 996 36,106 
1921 17,004 2,890 41,742 
1922 22,780 3,322 48,297 
1923 24,603 3,070 58,965 
1924 28,782 3,997 67,880 
1925 38,565 3,668 76,100 
Sources: Building Permits: Oregon Bureau of Municipal Research, Basic Factors, 6. Single-Family 
Houses: Harland Bartholomew and Associates, Report on Streets and Waterfront, 96. Motor 
Vehicles: Bartholomew, 353-54, and Charles H. Cheney, Major Traffic Street Plan, Boulevard and 
Park System for Portland, Oregon (Portland, 1921). 
na = not available 
table). The volume of banking transac- 
tions rose by 160 percent from 1905 to 
1912. "Prosperity Everywhere Appar- 
ent," trumpeted a local journalist in 
1910, "and No Cloud on Horizon."4 
The boom drew on the advantages of lo- 
cation and transportation that had al- 
ways worked in Portland's favor. Con- 
struction of James J. Hill's North Bank 
Railroad along the Columbia from Pasco 
to Portland began in 1906, and work on 
Swift and Company's huge packing 
plant in north Portland started in 1908. 
With the diversification of crops in west- 
ern Oregon and the rapid development 
of agriculture in the Inland Empire of 
the upper Columbia basin during the 
first decade of the century, the value of 
farm property quadrupled, and the pop- 
ulation grew by 500,000 in Portland's 
natural hinterland of Oregon, Idaho, and 
eastern Washington. Between 1899 and 
1910, accelerated cutting in the coastal 
ranges and Cascades raised the timber 
production of the Pacific states from 8 to 
19 percent of the national total.5 
Urban Government, 2d ed. (Chicago, 1950), 
10-16; John W. Reps, The Making of Urban 
America (Princeton, 1965), 519-25; and Mel 
Scott, American City Planning since 1890 
(Berkeley, 1969), 117-27. Continuity is an 
important theme in Thomas S. Hines, 
Burnham of Chicago (New York, 1974), and 
Norman J. Johnston, "Harland Bartholomew: 
Precedent for the Profession," Journal of the 
American institute of Planners, Vol. 39 
(March 1973), 115-24. Also see Carl Abbott, 
Portland : Planning, Politics, and Growth in a 
Twentieth-Century City (Lincoln, Neb., 1983), 
6-10, 267-73. 
4. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Twelfth Census 
of the United States, Taken in the Year 1900, 
Vol. 2: Population, Pt. 2 (Washington, D.C., 
1902), 583, and Thirteenth Census of the 
United States, Taken in the Year 1910, Vol. 4: 
Population: Occupation Statistics 
(Washington, D.C., 1914), 592-93; report on 
operations of Portland Clearing House (1915), 
in Henry Reed Papers, Oregon Historical 
Society (OHS), Portland; Portland Oregonian, 
Sept. 25,1910. 
5. Herbert D. Croly, "Portland, Oregon: The 
Transformation f the City from an 
Architectural nd Social Viewpoint," 
Architectural Record, Vol. 31 (1912), 592; 
"The Future of the North Coast Cities," 
World's Work, Vol. 18 (1909), 11945-47; 
Oregonian, Jan. 1, 1910; Henry Reed, "The 
Phenomenal Growth of Portland and Its 
Causes" (typescript, 1912), Reed Papers. For 
hinterland - defined as Idaho, the 19 eastern 
counties of Washington, and Oregon outside 
the immediate vicinity of Multnomah and 
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This 1910 map shows the boom in Portland's 
east-side development - and the start of 
suburban sprawl in the southeast. (Author's 
collection) 
Much of the building activity that 
helped fuel the Portland boom provided _ 
office space for the bankers, insurance 
agents, grain dealers, wholesalers, ac- 
countants, and attorneys who served the 
city's domestic and foreign trade. As 
total rentable downtown space grew 
from 900,000 square feet in 1900 to 
2,000,000 in 1910 and 2,900,000 in 1920, 
every Portlander could see the expan- 
sion of the central business district. By 
the time the building boom crested, the 
city had 95 buildings of at least 6 stories 
and 16 that towered 10 or more. The new 
city was brighter as well as taller, built 
with light bricks and glazed terra cotta 
rather than the heavy stone and cast 
iron of the last century.6 
The other obvious impact of the real es- 
tate boom was a remarkable shift of resi- 
dential patterns. In 1900, nearly two- 
thirds of Portland's population lived on 
the narrow strip of terraces and ravines 
between the Willamette and the looming 
West Hills. During the next two decades, 
however, Portland homes and home- 
owners followed streetcar lines across 
the city's five bridges to the east side of 
the Willamette. The old west-side neigh- 
borhoods began to lose population in 
the teens. The previously open lands of 
the east side, in contrast, housed ap- 
proximately two-thirds of all Portlanders 
by World War V 
The exigencies of growth turned the at- 
tention of Portland's business leadership 
to systematic planning. A second water 
pipeline from Mount Hood and a storage 
reservoir on Mount Tabor cost 
$1,720,000. The bill for streets and sew- 
ers came to $28 million from 1905 
through 1914, compared to $8 million 
for the entire period from 1865 through 
1904. A related issue was the need to 
maintain the structure of property val- 
ues by preserving easy access between 
the growing downtown and the new 
neighborhoods. The replacement of 
three old bridges and the construction of 
one additional crossing between 1904 
and 1913 took $4 million.8 
Portland's first serious experiment with 
comprehensive planning was therefore 
intended to assure maximum benefit 
from unprecedented public spending. 
Designation or actual construction of 
parks, streets, government offices, 
docks, and railroad terminals would set 
the geographic framework for private in- 
vestment. Planning would place no con- 
straints on development of private prop- 
erty, but a coherent city plan and the 
public investment that followed it 
would be persuasive guides for private 
developers. 
In pursuing these goals, Portland's com- 
munity leaders attempted to bring their 
city into step with new trends that were 
transforming much of urban America. 
The City Beautiful movement at the turn 
of the century was an effort o make 
American cities impressive, inspiring, 
and efficient. Its origins are often traced 
to the World's Columbian Exposition in 
Chicago in 1893, but the real inception 
Clackamas counties - development data, see 
Thirteenth Census, Vol. 6: Agriculture, 1909 
and 1910, 390-92 (Idaho), Vol. 7: Agriculture, 1909 and 1910, 410-13 (Oregon) and 840-43 
(Washington). For timber production see U.S. 
Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1957 
(Washington, D.C., 1960), 313. 
6. Harland Bartholomew and Associates, 
Report on Proposed System of Major Streets 
and Development of Waterfront (Portland, 
1932), 307-17; Henry Reed, "Heights of 
Existing Buildings in Portland" (typescript, 
1919), Reed Papers; Croly, 599. 
7. Twelfth Census, Vol. 1: Population,' 637 
(wards 1-7 west side, 8-11 east side), and 
Thirteenth Census, Vol. 3: Population, 523 
(wards 1-6 west side, 7-10 east side); 
Oregonian, Dec. 18, 1905; Charles H. Cheney, "General Report on City Planning and 
Housing Survey of Portland, Oregon, for the 
City Planning Commission" (typescript, March 1919), 100, Bureau of Planning, City of Portland. 
8. Portland City Club, "Graded Streets in 
Portland," City Club Bulletin, Vol. 1 
(August 12, 1921), 4. 
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was the revitalization of Pierre L'En- 
fant's plan for Washington, D.C., in 
1901-1902. At the request of a congres- 
sional committee, the architects Daniel 
Burnham and Charles McKim, the land- 
scape architect Frederick Law Olmsted, 
Jr., and the sculptor Augustus Saint- 
Gaudens toured the capitals of Europe 
before submitting plans for filling in the 
"magnificent distances" of Washington. 
In the same years, Charles M. Robinson 
advocated the coordination of street 
plans, civic centers, architecture, and 
landscaping in The improvement of 
Towns and Cities (1901) and Modern 
Civic Art (1903). Over the next decade, 
consultants and converts redesigned 
scores of American cities, giving par- 
ticular attention to metropolitan park 
systems, improved transportation, and 
development of civic centers with pub- 
lic buildings grouped around a park or 
plaza and served by radiating boule- 
vards. Buffalo, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, St. 
Louis, Detroit, Omaha, Dallas, Denver, 
Minneapolis, Los Angeles, and Seattle 
all benefited from plans in the City 
Beautiful tradition. Daniel Burnham's 
plans for San Francisco in 1905 and Chi- 
cago in 1909 were the most complete of 
these expressions of the City Beautiful 
approach. 
Following the Chicago and San Fran- 
cisco pattern, a private association of 
business and professional men spon- 
sored Portland's own City Beautiful 
plan. The first meeting of planning en- 
thusiasts in the fall of 1909 appointed a 
committee of 100, which in turn recom- 
mended creation of a permanent body, 
the Civic Improvement League. The new 
league set about raising $20,000 by pri- 
vate subscription to hire an expert to do 
a comprehensive plan for a civic center 
and for making Portland "an ideal city." 
Money came from the Oregonian and 
Oregon Journal, from major landowners, 
real estate investors, lumber and con- 
struction companies, architects, lawyers, 
manufacturers, and politicians. A num- 
ber of contributors had their arms 
twisted by Senator Jonathan Bourne, 
who knew Burnham from his work in 
Washington, D.C. The executive commit- 
tee was a commercial "who's who," 
with heavy representation from the land 
development and building sectors.9 
When Burnham was unable to under- 
take the commission, the Civic Improve- 
ment League happily accepted his rec- 
ommendation of Edward H. Bennett. A 
35-year-old English architect and 1902 
graduate of the École des Beaux-Arts, 
Bennett had directed the staffs of as- 
sistants and draftsmen as Burnham's 
chief lieutenant on the Chicago and San 
Francisco projects. He was noted for his 
interest in the basic transportation 
framework of a city as well as in its amen- 
ities. Bennett agreed to a contract in 
March 1910 at a fee of $500 per month 
plus expenses. Local newspapers chron- 
icled his public lectures, his meetings 
with league leaders, and his impressions 
after a return visit in June 1910 to ob- 
serve congestion during the Rose Fes- 
tival. He presented preliminary sketches 
to the Civic Improvement League in Feb- 
ruary 1911 and provided final sketches 
by the end of the summer.10 
Careful consultation assured that the 
Portland business community got what 
it wanted - "architectural engineering in 
its application to city building." Bennett 
gave special emphasis to street and rail 
traffic, the separation of economic func- 
tions for efficiency, and the enhance- 
ment of the city's natural beauty. In a 
city that already suffered from crowded 
streets, an outgrown harbor, and inade- 
quate parks, Bennett argued, additional 
growth "would be a calamity were not 
preparation made for it." One of the 
principles underlying his proposals was 
the need to accommodate the natural 
segregation of activities that came with 
urban expansion. In the organic city, 
"parts and activities [would be] closely 
related and well defined, but not con- 
flicting." A second principle was the 
need for a plan that would be imple- 
mented gradually over several decades: 
"the Plan indicates the equipment 
which the City must continuously ac- 
quire ... to serve convenience, utility 
and beauty, in progressive stages."11 
Dennett's plan for Greater Portland 
; worked outward from the center of the 
city. Anticipating a metropolitan popu- 
lation of 2 million, he called for three 
municipal centers as anchors for the 
business and office district - a set of 
Taller and brighter than before, post-1905 
Portland was characterized by buildings made 
of light bricks and glazed terra cotta. (Gifford 
neg. 7786, Oregon Historical Society) 
9. Oregon Journal (Portland), Nov. 13, 1909; 
Oregonian, Nov. 13, 1909; "Subscription List 
to City Beautiful Fund" (typescript, 1909), 
Mayor's Office Files, Portland City Archives; 
Mansel G. Blackford, "The Lost Dream: 
Businessmen and City Planning in Portland, 
Oregon, 1903-1914," Western HistoricaJ 
Quarterly, Vol. 15 (1984), 47-49. 
10. Hines, 180, 270; Daniel Burnham to C. B. 
Merrick, Dec. 18, 1909, in Daniel Burnham 
Papers, Chicago Art Institute; J. R. Wetherbee 
to Joseph Simon, Dec. 1, 1909, Feb. 28, March 
23, April 20, June 10, and Sept. 20, 1910, 
Mayor's Office Files; Oregonian, Nov. 13, 
1909, June 15, 1910, and Feb. 12, 1911. 
11. Merrick to A. G. Rushlight, Sept. 1, 1911, 
and Wetherbee to Simon, June 30, 1910 (first 
quotation), Mayor's Office Files. The 
description of the plan in this and the 
following paragraph is drawn from an article 
by Bennett in the Oregonian, Feb. 4, 1911, 
and from Marshall N. Dana, ed., The Greater 
Portland Plan of Edward H. Bennett 
(Portland, 1912) (quotations, 5, 25). 
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government offices grouped for con- 
venience and "nobility of appearance," 
a cultural center with a civic auditorium 
and museum, and a transportation cen- 
ter to include the post office and a 
union terminal. His response to the 
surge of residential growth east of the 
Willamette was a radial highway system 
stretching 20 miles east and southeast. 
The plan provided neighborhood parks 
and parkways to serve the expected east- 
side population. Separation of activities 
was to be realized most clearly along the 
waterways. By encouraging the already 
apparent movement of shipping and 
manufacturing to downstream locations, 
the city could free the central waterfront 
for freight wagons and railroads serving 
downtown wholesalers. Upstream, Ben- 
nett called for a waterfront park, em- 
bankments, and landings for pleasure 
boats. Downstream to the north, he sug- 
gested filling wetlands for docks and 
marine terminals. 
The local reaction was enthusiastic. Ion 
Lewis of the parks commission and J. R. 
Wetherbee of the Civic Improvement 
League proudly displayed Bennett's 
plans at the third national planning con- 
vention in Philadelphia in 1911. The 
league re-formed, expanding its base to 
include representatives of general civic 
organizations and neighborhood asso- 
ciations and becoming the Greater Port- 
land Plans Association (GPPA). Each 
civic group elected a member of the ad- 
visory committee. The executive com- 
mittee balanced league activists with 
representatives of the major newspapers 
and with smaller businessmen who had 
not previously been involved with Ben- 
nett's work.12 
The GPPA had the single purpose of pro- 
moting adoption of Bennett's plan. Feb- 
ruary 29, 1912, was Greater Portland Day 
by mayoral proclamation. Canvassers 
fanned out through the city at 10:30 a.m. 
when blasts from scores of factory whis- 
tles signaled the start of the associa- 
tion's membership drive. Seven thou- 
sand Portlanders purchased GPPA 
buttons at one dollar each. A second 
drive that began in June raised the total 
over 4,000 as the GPPA began to take 
stands on specific park and street plan- 
ning decisions. The final step was to se- 
cure formal recognition of the Bennett 
Plan by the voters, even though no bond 
issue accompanied the measure. In Oc- 
tober 1912, a committee headed by Mar- 
shall Dana, editor of the Oregon Journal, 
published a summary of Bennett's ideas 
using city funds. After a parade of cit- 
izens, a marching band, and 100 auto- 
mobiles moved through downtown Port- 
land on the evening of October 30, an 
audience of thousands heard Dana, the 
orator Frank Branch Riley, and Rabbi 
Jonah Wise praise the plan as Portland's 
pathway out of chaos. The tally on No- 
vember 2 was 2 to 1 in favor of adopting 
Bennett's cheme as the official plan of 
the city and requiring that the city coun- 
cil be guided by it as far as reasonable 
and practical.13 
Unfortunately, Portland ratified the plan 
just as the great boom collapsed. The 
price of wheat slipped below 1912 levels 
for two years. The price and production 
of lumber dropped in 1914 and 1915 as a 
depression hit the entire Northwest. The 
virtual standstill in population growth 
in 1914 crippled local construction, with 
the annual value of building permits 
falling from $20 million in 1910 to less 
than $4 million in 1917 (see table). Port- 
land had built 2,760 houses in 1912 at 
the peak of the boom. As vacancy rates 
climbed to 12 percent, the number of 
new houses dropped to 906 in 1915, 472 
in 1916, and 226 in 1917.14 
Hard times also halted the public im- 
provements that stood at the heart of the 
Greater Portland plan. As total assessed 
valuation fell, voters became worried 
about the burden of past debts. In No- 
vember 1912, Portlanders rejected a $2 
million bond issue for new parks even 
as they approved the Bennett Plan in the 
abstract. In June 1913, they again re- 
jected the park bonds, this time by a 
wider margin. Six months later, they 
turned down overwhelmingly a stopgap 
levy of $200,000 for improvements to 
existing parks. City spending on streets 
and sewers fell from $7,500,000 in 1911 
to an average of $600,000 in 1915, 1916, 
and 1917. Oregonians also reacted to 
previous spending by limiting revenue 
increases from property taxes to 6 per- 
cent a year, save in jurisdictions where 
voters approved higher local rates.15 
Economic recession quickly killed the 
interest of influential Portlanders in cre- 
ating Greater Portland. The plan had 
been purchased as a cure for the prob- 
lems of growth; it seemed irrelevant 
when that growth slowed. In addition, 
the plan lacked a definite niche or spon- 
sor within the municipal government. 
An outside consultant, Bennett had 
moved on to other projects. Powerful 
businessmen could force city council 
decisions on specific projects, but over- 
all progress required clear direction 
within City Hall. Although Mayor 
Joseph Simon and the city councilman 
George Baker had participated in the or- 
ganization of the Civic Improvement 
League, neither had been a strong advo- 
cate, and neither would guide the plan 
through the rough times. The city's 
switch from mayor-council to commis- 
sion government in 1913, following law 
enforcement and vice scandals, was also 
detrimental to Bennett's plan. Until vot- 
ers reaffirmed the commission charter in 
1917, personal infighting and power 
plays distracted the politicians,16 
.Fifteen months later, Portland was 
ready to try again. When Charles Cheney 
arrived at the request of the city council 
in 1918, he wanted everyone to know 
12. W. F. Woodward to Simon, April 25, 1911, 
and Merrick to Rushlight, Sept. 1, 1911, 
Mayor's Offices Files; Oregonian, May 18, 
1911; George Hinton, "Portland the 
Optimistic," Harper's Weekly, Vol. 57 
(May 24, 1913), 11. 
13. Howard Weed to Rushlight, July 1, 1912, 
Mayor's Office Files; Oregonian, Feb. 29, 
March 1, April 28, June 6, Oct. 31, and 
Nov. 3, 1912. Also see Greater Portland: 
Official Organ of Greater PortJand Plans 
Association, Vol. 1 (February-April 1912). 
14. For commodity prices see Historical 
Statistics, 123, 313-14, 317; for vacancy rates see Portland Water Bureau service data, Reed 
Papers; population estimated from school 
census and water service data. 
15. Henry Reed, "The County Budget and 
Annual Tax Levy" (MS, speech to Oregon 
Association of County Judges and County 
Commissioners, Dec. 8, 1915), Reed Papers; 
Oregonian, Nov. 4, 1912, June 4 and Dec. 10, 
1913; "Graded Streets," 4. 
16. R. D. Leigh, "Commission Government 
Ratified in Portland, Oregon," NationaJ 
Municipal Review, Vol. 7 (1918), 90-91; 
E. Kimbark MacColl, The Shaping of a City: Business and Politics in Portland, Oregon, 
1885-1915 (Portland, 1976), 442-45; H. R. 
Albee, "Portland: The Ideal City," Oregon 
Country, Vol. 22 (February 1915), 61-67. 
Edward Bennett proposed diagonal boulevards, 
east-side business development, and riverfront 
industrial areas to the north. (The Greater 
Portland Plan, 1912) 
that he was a different sort of planning 
consultant - practical rather than vi- 
sionary. His résumé looked remarkably 
like Bennett's, with an architecture de- 
gree from Berkeley in 1905, study at the 
École des Beaux- Arts, and travels in Eu- 
rope. While Bennett had worked with 
the country's most prestigious planning 
firm and drafted big plans for big cities, 
however, Cheney had scrambled to make 
a reputation through free-lance con- 
sulting for smaller cities like Fresno, 
Palo Alto, and Berkeley. Bennett had 
come to Portland with elaborate draw- 
ings and interesting plans, said Cheney, 
but no one in the city had taken final 
responsibility for carrying them out. 
While splendid studies of Portland and other 
cities were made, their effect was largely the 
same as shooting into the air, most of the rec- 
ommendations being so far over the heads, or 
beyond the grasp of existing authority and 
legislation that these splendid early civic 
efforts went beside the mark and were largely 
wasted.17 
Cheney's task in Portland was eminently 
practical. American entry into World 
War I brought an explosive shipbuilding 
boom to Portland, as the Emergency 
Fleet Corporation placed orders for 
scores of steel- and wood-hulled cargo 
vessels. At their peak just before the Ar- 
mistice, Portland shipyards employed 
approximately 28,000 workers. Shipyard 
purchases supported roughly 5,000 
more jobs in foundries, machine shops, 
lumber yards, and sawmills. The crea- 
tion of more than 30,000 new industrial 
jobs put an obvious strain on housing 
and public services. The best indicator 
17 
of annual population increases is the 
city's school census, which counted 
fewer than 50,000 school-age children at 
the nadir of Portland's depression in 
1915-16. The total jumped to 58,713 in 
1918 and swelled to 60,000 in 1920. City 
officials estimated the city's population 
at 270,000 at the end of 1917, and esti- 
mates a year later ranged around the as- 
tonishing figure of 320,000. The unex- 
pected shortajge of housing made it 
difficult for shipyards to hold workers, 
disturbed federal officials who awarded 
contracts, and threatened both public 
health and neighborhood stability.18 
The official response was to hire Cheney 
in September 1918 to find out how 
much, where, and what kind of housing 
was needed. When he took the job, he 
had just finished similar work in Los 
Angeles and Alameda. He promised his 
first results in two months rather than 
Bennett's two years. Previous plans for 
Portland, Cheney told an interviewer, 
had been "directed more to the embel- 
lishment of the city . . . than to the 
housing problem which will now be 
given primary attention and which after 
all is the more practical way for the city 
to approach planning for the future." A 
detailed study of housing demand and 
supply, he added, could generate com- 
prehensive suggestions for public facili- 
ties, recreation, schools, and the regu- 
lation of land development, and it could 
pave the way for a needed and perma- 
nent city planning and housing 
commission.19 
When the end of the war eased Port- 
land's housing crisis two months after 
Cheney's arrival, he turned his full at- 
17. Charles Cheney to George Baker, Aug. 27, 
1918, Mayor's Office Files; Cheney, "General 
Report" (quotation); Scott, 161-64. 
18. Charles Cheney, "First Preliminary 
Report to the Housing and City Planning 
Committee" (typescript, Oct. 29, 1918), 
Bureau of Planning, City of Portland, and 
"General Report," 21; Edgar Sensenisch, 
"Portland, Oregon," Banker's Magazine, Vol. 
97 (1918), 654-55; Oregonian, Jan. 1 and 
Oct. 19, 1919. For population estimates ee 
Oregonian, Jan. 1, 1919, and Cheney, "General 
Report," 10. 
19. "Statement on Hiring of Charles Cheney," 
Sept. 25, 1918, Mayor's Office Files. 
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tention to the underlying goal of the 
city's business leadership. Both Cheney 
and the businessmen who had urged his 
employment understood that his larger 
mandate was to use the housing survey 
as the wedge for a renewed effort at 
comprehensive city planning that would 
help to channel the location of new con- 
struction during a period of fast growth. 
The key to such planning, they believed, 
was the exciting new tool of land use 
zoning. Adoption of a systematic zoning 
code in New York City triggered action 
for zoning in dozens of other cities from 
Baltimore and Philadelphia to Los An- 
geles and Sacramento. To support Che- 
ney's work, the city's ad hoc housing 
committee in September 1918 asked for 
additional funds 
for working out with each part of the city of 
Portland such districting and building regu- 
lations as are necessary there to stop the in- 
vasion of home neighborhoods by types of 
buildings unsuited to them and the holdback 
of industrial districts for lack of protections 
and municipal improvements, all of which 
now cause demoralization and discontent of 
labor, deterioration of property values, and 
Joss of rents and taxable return to the city.20 
With Cheney drafting the text and 
Mayor George Baker supplying the polit- 
ical leadership in response to the con- 
cerns of his business community sup- 
porters, the city council created the City 
Planning Commission on December 27, 
1918. According to the text of the ordi- 
nance, the commission was to offer ad- 
vice and suggestions to the city and to 
other units of government on street ex- 
tension and widening, the acceptance of 
plats and subdivisions, the location of 
public buildings, parking and traffic 
congestion, housing conditions, and 
"the establishment of zones or districts 
limiting the use, height, area and bulk of 
buildings and structures." It could rec- 
ommend plans for beautifying the city, 
for improving sanitation and utilities, 
for expanding harbor and transportation 
facilities, and for generally regulating 
future growth. Its first members were 
picked to represent the chamber of com- 
merce, banking, organized labor, real- 
tors, architects, and civil engineers. Sev- 
eral had been active in the Civic 
Improvement League. 
The new planning commission agreed 
on a crash program for zoning the city. 
Bennett's plan for parks (upper right) made use 
of the crest of the West Hills, the river lowlands, 
and the ridge lines for boulevards and 
parkways. (Author's collection) 
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Although Cheney pointed to a broad 
range of benefits, the business leaders 
and large property owners who con- 
tinued to furnish the major backing f jt 
Portland planning had little interest 
whether zoning could make life easier 
for city engineers or improve the condi- 
tions of the poor. Like the county as- 
sessor Henry Reed, they favored zoning 
because it "would tend to stabilize 
[land] values." On the central business 
blocks, height limitations could prevent 
new skyscrapers from cutting off light 
and air to older buildings and destroy- 
ing their rental value. In outlying Port- 
land, use zones could prevent the intru- 
sion of businesses into residential areas 
and minimize the blighting effect of hos- 
pitals, which the recent construction of 
Good Samaritan in northwest Portland 
had demonstrated. A special worry was 
the rapid spread of gasoline service sta- 
tions and garages within residential 
neighborhoods. A proposal to erect a 
large garage in the heart of the Irvington 
area in early 1919 helped to build inter- 
est in zoning. Paul Murphy, a land de- 
velopment executive responsible for the 
elegant Laurelhurst neighborhood, cited 
the planning work of J. C. Nichols in 
Kansas City and urged systematic plan- 
ning to protect the future value of Port- 
land real estate. The banker and utility 
investor J. C. Ainsworth summarized 
the establishment position for the 
Oregon Journal: 
$300,000,000 has already been invested in 
Portland real estate. . . . The lending institu- 
tions in the city, in conjunction with the 
property owners, are there/ore heartily in 
favor, 1 believe, of a plan . . . that will tend to 
conserve and protect values, because of the 
permanence and stability that can only he 
secured by a far-sighted zoning plan that will 
harmonize the property interest of owners 
and the health, safety, and convenience of 
the pubJic.21 
Among zoning advocates were Mayor 
Baker, heavyweight members of the 
downtown business community, and 
homeowners in affluent neighborhoods. 
The counterattack against property regu- 
lation came from smaller property 
owners and real estate brokers. These 
opponents argued that zoning blocked 
the natural growth of the city, benefiting 
a few land barons and upper-crust 
neighborhoods at the expense of the 
broad middle class. Behind their protest 
was the fear that restricting areas to sin- 
Charles Cheney used this picture to illustrate 
the need for land use zoning to protect 
residential neighborhoods. ("General Report on 
City Planning," 1919) 
gle-family use would end the lucrative 
practice of building apartments or stores 
on residential properties. Thus, both 
real estate speculators and landowners 
whose only capital was one or two city 
lots joined in common cause against 
zoning.22 
The campaign against planning started 
with a direct attack on Cheney and an 
indirect attack on the planning commis- 
sion. The News called Cheney "a dapper 
and dandified little gentleman with an 
uncanny mastery of the subtle art of 
gab." His retainer of $500 per month as 
a half-time consultant, the paper con- 
tinued, paid him for rounds of golf with 
Portland bigwigs and afternoon tea at 
the high-toned Arlington Club. With 
Cheney transformed into a partial lia- 
bility, the council decided not to renew 
his contract for a second year or to fund 
other staff or the planning commission. 
The council reversed itself in December 
1919 after strong protest and threats of 
resignation by planning commission 
members, but it still cut the commis- 
sion's budget by half. Council hearings 
on the zoning ordinance in November 
and December also brought the opposi- 
tion out in force. Scores of residents in 
lower income or half-developed east- 
side neighborhoods like Montavilla ap- 
pealed the specific designations of their 
properties. Other disgruntled voters 
complained that the commission had 
packed its citizens advisory committees 
and that the entire scheme was being 
railroaded before the public knew what 
was happening. In January, the Portland 
Realty Board took a formal stand against 
zoning, resolving that it was a ruthless 
interference with property that would 
raise rents by limiting apartment build- 
ing. The Citizens Anti-Zoning League, 
as the historian Kimbark MacColl has 
noted, was little more than a front for re- 
alty interests.23 
¿Lioning advocates relied on the prestige 
of leading citizens, the endorsement of 
20. Housing Committee to Baker, Sept. 23, 
1918 (quotation), and "Statement on Hiring 
Cheney," Mayor's Office Files. 
21. Cheney, "General Report," 104-106; Paul 
Murphy to Baker, Nov. 27, 1918, Mayor's 
Office Files; Oregonian, Oct. 26, Nov. 1 
(quotation) and 30, 1919; Portland Telegram, 
April 25 and Dec. 8, 1919; SeJJwood Bee 
(Portland), Sept. 5, 1919; Oregon Journal, 
Feb. 28, 1920; E. Kimbark MacColl, The 
Growth of a City: Power and Politics in 
Portland, Oregon, 1915 to 1950 (Portland, 
1979), 296. 
22. Telegram, Aug. 1, 1919; Oregonian, July 1, 
1919. 
23. Portland News, July 29, 1919; Oregonian, 
Oct. 25, Dec. 5, 17, and 21, 1919, Jan. 10, 1920; 
TeJegram, Dec. 19, 1919, Jan. 10 and 13, 
March 24, 1920; Portland Planning 
Commission, Minutes, Nov. 17, 1920, Bureau 
of Planning, City of Portland; MacColl, 
Growth of a City, 298. 
20 PACIFIC NORTHWEST QUARTERLY 
the Central Labor and Building Trades 
councils, and the backing of progressive 
civic groups such as the Architectural 
Club, City Club, and Oregon Civic 
League. Editorials portrayed a simple 
contest between Progress and Reaction. 
Zoning, said the Oregonian, was "an 
effort under the direction of public-spir- 
ited and far-visioned men, to make a 
more orderly and prosperous city." The 
Telegram thought that "city planning is 
progress indubitably proven." Oppo- 
nents were "standstillers, reactionaries, 
and retrogressionists ... the malcon- 
tents, the indifferent, the uninformed."24 
Caught in the controversy, city council 
members began to cast around for a 
graceful way to desert a leaky ship. In its 
confusion, the council adopted the zon- 
ing ordinance on March 17, 1920, by a 3 
to 2 vote but repealed it on March 31 
pending the outcome of a November ef- 
erendum, The repeal was to take effect 
on December 1 if the voters in fact 
agreed to live without zoning. After the 
extended debate in the winter of 
1919-20, the fall campaign raised no new 
issues. "Save Your Homes," trumpeted 
the ads placed by zoning advocates, who 
claimed to represent "the 29 Neigh- 
borhoods of the City." Prevent "vicious 
discrimination . . . against the small 
property and home owner," countered 
the opponents. The result was a narrow 
defeat for zoning, 30,706 to 30,288, on a 
turnout of 40 percent of eligible voters.25 
The vote actually occurred in an eco- 
nomic environment of painful readjust- 
ment rather than of wartime prosperity. 
The staggering wartime inflation that 
nearly doubled consumer prices reached 
its peak in 1920. Shipyard workers and 
their ready cash scattered as the yards 
closed during 1919, and the federal cen- 
sus of 1920 reported disappointing to- 
tals-not 325,000 Portlanders, but only 
258,000 (300,000 in the metropolitan 
district). With urban growth temporarily 
stalled, it had been hard to argue in 1920 
that zoning was a vital emergency 
measure. 
Zoning came back under consideration 
during more prosperous years later in 
the decade. The value of building per- 
mits reached $17 million in 1921, for the 
highest total since the great boom of 
1911, and climbed to a new high of $38 
In addition to protecting neighborhoods, zoning 
could prevent new construction from blocking 
the light and air of older buildings downtown. 
(Photography Collection, University of 
Washington Libraries) 
million in 1925. Data on building per- 
mits and water connections how an an- 
nual average of 3,400 new houses from 
1921 through 1925 (see table). The un- 
precedented availability of 70 percent, 
80 percent, and even 90 percent mort- 
gages spurred construction of 400 new 
apartment buildings; sited haphazardly 
throughout the city, they created worries 
about housing quality and the future of 
neighborhoods. The second and suc- 
cessful try to zone Portland occurred as 
zoning became an accepted part of 
American urban government. Under the 
leadership of Herbert Hoover, the U.S. 
Department of Commerce published a 
model for state zoning laws in February 
1924. Hoover noted in his introduction 
that "the discovery that it is practical by 
city zoning to carry out reasonably 
neighborly agreements as to the use of 
land has made an almost instant appeal 
to the American people." Portland's 
archrival, Seattle, was among the 218 
cities with zoning ordinances by the 
end of 1923. The total was more than 
500 by 1927. On the national scene, zon- 
ing was both accepted and acceptable.26 
The second try in Portland was sup- 
ported not only by the climate of opin- 
ion but also by new tactics that reversed 
the procedures of 1919. The first effort 
had been directed by an outside consul- 
tant and left open to public input at 
every step. At the end of 1921, in con- 
trast, the planning commission desig- 
nated members to work with the Port- 
land Realty Board on a small committee. 
The strongest support again came from 
middle- and upper-class neighborhoods 
like Irvington, Ladd's Addition, East- 
moreland, and Portland Heights, where 
the greatest concern was residential 
amenities. Pressures for zoning mounted 
as deed restrictions expired in several 
neighborhoods and left middle-class 
housing unprotected. The committee 
spent 18 months in quiet meetings. Only 
after the sensitive issues had been nego- 
tiated to the satisfaction of real estate 
and building interests did the planning 
commission publish the suggested code 
and zoning map in August 1923. With 
the real estate industry now added to 
the list of zoning advocates, voters ap- 
24. For quotations see Oregonian, Jan. 15, 
1920, and Telegram, March 1, 1920. Also see 
Telegram, Jan. 14, Feb. 23, March 3, 1920, 
and Portland Forum, Dec. 12, 1919. 
25. Oregon Voter, Vol. 23 (Oct. 30, 1920), 46 
(first quotation); Telegram, March 24, 1920 
(second quotation); MacColl, Growth of a 
City, 300; Oregonian, Nov. 6, 1920. 
26. Portland Planning and Housing 
Association, Bulletin, December 1929 and 
February 1932, Housing Authority Papers, 
OHS; Scott, 194 (Hoover quotation), 249. 
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proved the revised code by 41,504 to 
28,105 in November 1924.27 
The guiding principle of the ordinance 
was simplicity. Planning commission 
members thought that confusion about 
height and area districts and an exces- 
sively detailed zoning map had contrib- 
uted to the defeat in 1920. Instead of the 
64 height, area, and use districts possi- 
ble under Cheney's proposal, the new 
scheme divided Portland into 4 use 
zones: single family, multifamily, com- 
mercial, and unrestricted. Deed restric- 
tions took precedence when they were 
more stringent than zoning. The zoning 
map carved the city into large sectors 
with uniform zoning. All river frontage 
went into zones 3 and 4 for factories and 
warehouses. Most properties along trol- 
ley lines were placed in zone 3 to en- 
courage commercial strip development. 
About two-thirds of residential land was 
zoned multifamily, to satisfy large apart- 
ment developers and to allow small 
owners to exploit their holdings with 
duplexes. With few exceptions, the 
planning commission waited for re- 
quests from affluent and well-organized 
neighborhoods before designating areas 
for single-family use. The result was that 
the upper third of Portland neigh- 
borhoods now received the protection 
they had sought since 1919.28 
The overall system of zoning both ac- 
commodated and sanctioned the exist- 
ing division of land among economic 
functions and social classes. Second- 
class citizenship under the ordinance 
went to working-class neighborhoods 
such as Corbett, Sellwood, Sunnyside, 
Sabin, Woodlawn, Kenton, and St. 
Johns. The neighborhoods placed in 
zone 1 - Mount Tabor, Laurelhurst, 
Ladd's Addition, Grant Park, Alameda, 
Irvington, Eastmoreland, University 
Park, Portland Heights, Council Crest- 
have held their higher status for more 
than 60 years. Although zoning opened 
the fullest opportunities for future 
growth that were consistent with the 
basic idea of land use regulation, it also 
proved less relevant than hoped. As 
every planning advocate admitted from 
the start, it allowed much more intense 
development than the city would likely 
ever achieve. It also went into effect as 
the building boom of the early 1920s be- 
gan to dissolve into the Great Depres- 
sion. From the mid-1920s to the mid- 
19308, both planning and the planning 
commission suffered neglect compara- 
ble to that of the Bennett Plan. Portland 
was no closer to becoming Greater Port- 
land in 1930 than it had been in 1905. 29 
In historical perspective, Bennett's plan 
and Cheney's work for Portland show 
more similarities than differences. De- 
spite the presumed changes in the plan- 
ning profession during the second dec- 
ade of the century, both consultants 
shared the basic interest in linking all 
aspects of physical development in a 
comprehensive city plan. The major dif- 
ference in the content of the proposals 
was the order in which the author ap- 
proached the various plan elements. 
Bennett started with access to the cen- 
tral business district as the single most 
important problem. His plan gave care- 
ful attention to details for downtown 
growth, arterial streets, and railroads. 
The location and allocation of indus- 
trial, residential, and park land were de- 
termined by the regional transportation 
framework. Cheney started with the 
maintenance of stable neighborhoods as 
the most general goal. As a conse- 
quence, he considered that the proper 
location of industrial areas should be 
determined by their relationship to resi- 
dential areas as well as by their rail and 
river connections. Development of the 
grid of minor streets was as important as 
the development of radial highways. The 
central west side was treated not only as 
a commercial core, but also as an area of 
dense population with particular hous- 
ing problems. 
More important, the two men worked in 
similar circumstances. The established 
businessmen and landowners who were 
their effective mployers (through the 
Civic Improvement League or the plan- 
ning commission) wanted to buy plans 
rather than a process for planning. They 
shared the attitude that planners were 
urban physicians who could diagnose a 
city's complaints and prescribe a spe- 
cific product or procedure. In Portland, 
the ailment was disorderly growth, first 
during the boom of 1905-12 and again 
during World War I. However, Bennett 
and Cheney delivered their remedies 
just as economic slumps eased the im- 
mediate symptoms, and the city's lead- 
ership lost its sense of urgency about 
planning. The same series of events re- 
curred in the 1920s. Portland adopted a 
weak zoning code in response to an ac- 
tive real estate market from 1921 to 1925, 
but interest in planning declined as 
soon as the market cooled. 
The experience of Portland during the 
first quarter of the 20th century reaf- 
firms that planning is a political acti- 
vity. Both Edward Bennett and Charles 
Cheney drew their proposals in order to 
meet the problems troubling their em- 
ployers rather than to point the way to 
an ideal city. They suggested specific 
protection for new streetcar suburbs 
from the sorts of change that had re- 
duced the attractiveness of older resi- 
dential areas, and they offered ways to 
stabilize the value of existing buildings. 
Their plans also rose and fell on the 
strength of public interest and support 
rather than on technical merit. As im- 
ported experts, they had no continuing 
role in Portland; they could do nothing 
to prevent the dwindling of initial en- 
thusiasm or the failure to implement the 
proposals. Given its narrow conception 
of the function of city planning, Port- 
land's civic leadership got what it 
wanted. D 
Carl Abbott is professor of urban stud- 
ies and planning at Portland State Uni- 
versity. A specialist in urban history, he 
is the author of several books, including 
The New Urban America: Growth and 
Politics in SunbeJt Cities (1981) and 
Portland: Planning, Politics and Growth 
in a Twentieth-Century City (1983). 
27. Portland Planning Commission, Minutes, 
Nov. 30, 1921, July 19 and Dec. 27, 1923, and 
"Report for 1924," Bureau of Planning, City of 
Portland; Strong and MacNaughton Company, 
newsletter, March 1923 and January 1924, 
OHS; Oregonian, Aug. 5, 1923, Nov. 7, 1924. 
28. Portland Planning Commission, "Report 
for 1925," Bureau of Planning, City of 
Portland. 
29. Ibid.; idem, "One Year of Zoning in 
Portland," Bureau of Planning, City of 
Portland; Lloyd Keefe, "History of Zoning in 
Portland" (typescript, 1975), 5-7, OHS; PJan-It 
(Portland Planning Commission ewsletter), 
Vol. 8 (November 1934), Vol. 11 (January 
1937). 
